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COPYRIGHT LAW 
SUMMARY 
INDIRECT PROFITS MAYBE INCLUDED AS DAMAGES 
FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Frank Music v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,t the Ninth Cir-
cuit found that indirect profits from an infringing use of a copy-
right could be included in a computation of the infringer's prof-
its under section 101(b) of the Copyright Act of 1909.2 
Plaintiffs filed suit alleging copyright infringement, unfair 
competition and breach of contract, after defendants used five 
songs from plaintiffs' dramatico-musical play, Kismet, in a musi-
cal revue staged at the MGM Grand Hotel in Las Vegas between 
1974 and 1976. Defendants, the hotel-casino operator and the 
show's producer-director, claimed their use fell within the terms 
of a blanket license agreement between themselves and the 
American Society for Composers, Authors and Publishers (AS-
CAP).s The district court· found that the license specifically ex-
cluded use of "visual representations"l1 of plaintiffs' work, that 
1. 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985) (per Fletcher, J.; other panel members were 
Boochever, J., and Reinhardt, J.). 
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). Although this Act has been superceded by the Copy-
right Act of 1976, current Title 17 of the United States Code, all actions complained of 
in this suit occurred before the effective date of the new Act, January I, 1978. 772 F.2d 
at 512 n.4. 
3. 772 F.2d at 510. In 1965, plaintiffs granted to ASCAP the right to license certain 
rights in the musical score of their play. [d. 
4. Trial was held in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, Robert J. Kelleher, District Judge, presiding. 
5. 772 F.2d at 511. Paragraph 3 of the license provided, in pertinent part, that 
"[t]his license shall not extend to or be deemed to include: ... songs or other excerpts 
39 
1
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the defendants' use was therefore an infringing use, and awarded 
plaintiffs $22,000 as that share of defendants' profits attributa-
ble to the infringement.6 The district court dismissed the unfair 
competition and breach of contract claims. Both parties 
appealed. 
II. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that 
the defendants' use was beyond the scope of their license.7 On 
appeal, the defendants argued that the district court failed to 
give sufficient consideration to the source of alleged copying. De-
fendants claimed that visual representations which could be said 
to have been derived from the original stage play, Kismet, would 
not be protected by plaintiffs' copyright which extended only to 
the dramatico-musical adaptation of the play.8 The panel found 
this argument unpersuasive on two counts: 1) that the evidence 
established that the producer had access to and relied on the 
plaintiffs' Broadway score; and 2) that the question of the 
copyrightability of the "visual representations" was irrelevant, 
since the prohibition in the license was not limited to "copy-
rightable" visual representations.9 
The panel then turned to the issue of damages. The Copy-
right Act of 190910 provided for recovery of "such damages as 
the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringe~ 
ment, as well as all the profits which the infringer shall have 
made from such an infringement."ll Actual damages are the ex-
tent to which the market value of a copyrighted work has been 
injured or destroyed by an infringement. 111 A court could also 
from operas or musical plays accompanied either by words, pantomime, dance, or visual 
representation of the work from which the music is taken .... " [d. at 511 n.2 (empha-
sis added). 
6. [d. at 509. 
7. [d. at 512. 
8. [d. at 511. The original dramatic play Kismet was written by Edward Knoblock 
in 1911 and copyrighted as an unpublished work that same year. The work was again 
copyrighted as a published work in 1912. These copyrights expired in 1967 and thus the 
work was in the public domain at the time of the defendants' infringement. [d. at 509-10. 
9. [d. at 512. See supra note 5. 
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). 
11. [d. 
12. 772 F.2d at 512 (quoting 3 M. NIMMER. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.02 at 14-6 
(1985)). 
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award statutory "in lieu" damages. IS The Ninth Circuit had al-
ways interpreted the above-quoted section of the Act as allowing 
the greater of the actual damage to plaintiff's copyright or the 
infringer's profits. H 
The district court in the instant case found that the plain-
tiffs had failed to prove any actual damage to their copyright, 
since they had failed to show that the market value of the copy-
righted work had been diminished.lI~ The test in the Ninth Cir-
cuit for determining market. value at the time of the infringe-
ment is "what a willing buyer would have been reasonably 
required to pay to a willing seller for plaintiffs' work."ls Plain-
tiffs introduced opinion testimony to the effect that defendants' 
use had completely destroyed the market in Las Vegas for a full 
production of Kismet, thereby entitling them to recover the 
value of a license for a full production.17 Although this testimony 
was uncontradicted, the Ninth Circuit noted that the trial court 
was entitled to reject any proffered measure of damages which is 
too speculative. IS Uncertainty as to the amount of actual dam-
ages will not prevent their recovery, but uncertainty as to the 
fact of damages may.19 Plaintiffs had not presented any "disin-
terested testimony" to the effect that defendants' use of six min-
utes of plaintiffs' work precluded plaintiffs from presenting Kis-
met in its entirety at another hotePO Since it was reasonable to 
conclude that defendants' use did not significantly impair the 
prospects of presenting a full production, the panel concluded 
that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding plain-
tiffs' theory of damages too uncertain and speculative.21 
Because the court determined that no actual damage had 
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). This section allowed the court to award, "in lieu of 
actual damages and profits, such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered 
due to the to the court shall appear to be just." Id. See infra note 45. 
14. 772 F.2d at 512 & n.5. 
15. Id. at 513. 
16. Id. at 513 n.6 (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions v. McDonald's, 
562 F.2d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 1977) (Krofft 1)). 
17. 772 F.2d at 513. 
18.Id. 
19. Id. (citing Universal Pictures v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 369 (9th Cir. 
1947»(emphasis added). 
20. 772 F.2d at 513. The opinion testimony relating to the value of a license for a 
full production was given by the copyright owner and the leasing agent. Id. 
21. Id. at 513-14. 
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occurred, it turned to the issue of the infringer's profits. In es-
tablishing the infringer's profits, the plaintiff is required to 
prove only the defendant's gross revenue from the infringement; 
the burden then shifts to the defendant to prove the elements of 
costs to be deducted from revenue to arrive at profit.22 However, 
in the event the infringement is willful, conscious or deliberate, 
there is no deduction for the infringer's overhead.23 
The district court allowed deductions for direct and indirect 
costs amounting to eighty-nine percent of the revenue collected 
for defendants' revue.24 The plaintiffs appealed these calcula-
tions on several grounds.211 Plaintiffs first argued that the de-
fendants' use was willful and deliberate and, therefore, no de-
ductions should have been allowed. The Ninth Circuit rejected 
this argument, affirming the district court's determination that 
defendants believed they were acting within the scope of their 
ASCAP license.26 
Plaintiffs further charged that the defendants had failed to 
adequately prove that each item of claimed overhead assisted in 
the production of the infringing revue. Defendants calculated 
the claimed expenses by allocating a portion of the total operat-
ing expenses of the hotel based on the ratio between the revenue 
generated by the show and the total revenue of the hotel. 27 The 
district court accepted nearly all of the defendants' calculations 
as presented.28 While the Ninth Circuit accepted the district 
court's finding that this method of allocation was a reasonably 
acceptable formula, the panel concluded that defendants had 
failed to prove that these expenses actually contributed to the 
production of the show.29 The court stated: 
22. 1d. at 514 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970)). 
23. [d. at 515 (citing Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 1331 (9th Cir. 
1984)). 
24. 1d. at 514-15. The district court found gross revenue from the revue of 
$24,191,690 from which it deducted $18,060,084 of direct costs and $3,641,960 of indirect 
costs (overhead) to arrive at a net profit of $2,489,646. [d. at 515. 
25. 1d. at 515. Plaintiffs made several challenges, although the court dealt with some 
of them in a footnote. 1d. at 515 n.9. These challenges pertained to the district court's 
failure to exclude, as a sanction for failure to cooperate in discovery, certain evidence 
offered by the defendants. All of these challenges were rejected by the court. [d. 
26. 1d. at 515. 
27. 1d. at 516. 
28. 1d. at 516 & n.l0. 
29. 1d. at 516. 
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[A] deduction for overhead should be allowed 
"only when the infringer can demonstrate that 
[the overhead expense] was of actual assistance in 
the production, distribution or sale of the infring-
ing product." [citations omitted]. We do not take 
this to mean that an infringer must prove his 
overhead expenses and their relationship to the 
infringing production in minute detail. [citations 
omitted]. Nonetheless, the defendant bears the 
burden of explaining, at least in general terms, 
how claimed overhead actually contributed to the 
production of the infringing work. so 
43 
The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendants had offered no 
evidence of what costs were included in the general categories 
presented to the trial court, nor did they offer any evidence con-
cerning how these costs contributed to the production of the in-
fringing show.81 The panel concluded, therefore, that the district 
court's finding that defendants had established the connection 
between the claimed expenses and the production was clearly 
erroneous.82 
The question of whether plaintiffs were entitled to recover 
"indirect profits" from an infringment was one of first impres-
sion before the court. Plaintiffs specifically challenged the fail-
ure of the district court to include MGM's profits from its hotel 
and casino operations in arriving at the gross revenue. In its 
computations, the district court had relied only upon the gross 
revenue from the show, apparently ignoring the plaintiffs' 
claim.88 The court first looked to the 1909 Act, which provided 
that the copyright owner was entitled to "all the profits which 
the infringer shall have made. . . . "84 The panel concluded that 
the language was broad enough to permit recovery of indirect as 
well as direct profits.8G The court also looked to other cases from 
the Ninth Circuit, including Sid & Marty Krofft Television Pro-
30. Id. (quoting Kamar Int'l v. Russ Berrie & Co., 752 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 
1984)). 
31. 772 F.2d at 516. 
32.Id. 
33. Id. at 516-17. 
34. Id. at 517 (refering to 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970». 
35.Id. 
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ductions v. McDonald's (Krofft II),36 where the court awarded 
substantial statutory "in lieu" damages for use of plaintiff's 
characters in a series of television commercials.37 Although the 
court in Krofft II found plaintiff's formula for computing the 
indirect profit to be too speculative, the court found a higher 
award of damages to be warranted where a significant portion of 
the infringer's profit was not "ascertainable."38 
The panel here found the promotional value of defendants' 
show to be analogous to the promotional value of the television 
commercials in Krofft II. Since the purpose of the show was to 
draw people to the hotel and gaming tables, the court concluded 
that the profits from these operations should be included in the 
damage computation, if such amounts could be ascertained.39 
The court then addressed the issue of apportioning profits 
between those attributable to the infringing acts and those at-
tributable to other factors. The burden of proving the contribu-
tion of profit elements other than the infringed property is the 
defendant's.4o Only a just and reasonable apportionment is re-
quired; the trial court need not be exact and a formula will be 
upheld so long as it is not clearly erroneous.41 The district court 
determined that the plaintiffs should be awarded $22,000, but 
gave no reasoned explanation or formula for its apportionment.42 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court's 
award was grossly inadequate.43 The panel examined the record 
and found conflicting evidence as to the relative importance of 
36. 1983 COPYRIGHT LAW DECISIONS (CCH) 1125,572 at 18,381 (C.D. Cal. 1983)(Krofft 
I1), on remand from 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
37. [d. at 18,387. 
38. [d. at 18,384 & n.ll. The plaintiffs in the Krofft cases, creators of the "H.R. 
PufnstuC' children's television program, alleged that they were entitled to a portion of 
the profit earned by McDonald's on its food sales as damages for the "McDonaldland" 
television commercials which infringed on plaintiffs' copyright. The Ninth Circuit re-
jected plaintiffs' formula for computing these profits as speculative. However, in award-
ing $1,044,000 in statutory "in lieu" damages, the Ninth Circuit stated that "because a 
significant portion of the defendant's profits are unascertainable, a higher award of in 
lieu damages is warranted." [d. 
39. 772 F.2d at 517. 
40. [d. at 518 (citing Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 592 F.2d 651, 
657 (2nd Cir. 1978)). 
41. 772 F.2d at 518. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
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the Kismet music to the defendants' show. The panel also noted 
that the award amounted to less than one percent of MGM 
Grand's profits from the show, which was wholly disproportion-
ate both to the success of the show and to the magnitude of the 
defendants' profit." The panel remanded the apportionment is-
sue to the district court with instructions to fully explain its rea-
sons and the resulting method of apportionment it selects, and 
to include indirect profits in the calculation if possible. The 
panel cautioned, however, that if the district court was unable to 
devise a reasonable, nonspeculative formula, then the district 
court should grant statutory "in lieu" damages.4G 
In its discussion of statutory damages, the Ninth Circuit re-
iterated the purposes of the remedy provisions of the Copyright 
Act: to provide adequate compensation to the copyright owner, 
to discourage wrongful conduct, and to deter infringement.48 
The panel concluded that the district court's award was obvi-
ously too little to discourage wrongful conduct or deter infring-
ment, and instructed the district court on remand to exercise its 
discretion to award statutory damages which effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act.47 
The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court's apparent 
judgment of joint and several liability of the defendants.48 The 
panel noted that joint and several liability is proper for an 
award of actual damages, but that each infringer is liable for its 
44. [d. The court noted in a footnote that the apportionment percentages in similar 
cases were markedly higher. [d. at 518 n.ll (citing, inter alia, Universal Pictures v. Har-
old Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 377 (9th Cir. 1947)(infringing use of one comedy sketch in 
motion picture; court affirmed award of 20% of infringing movie's profits)). 
45. [d. at 519. Statutory "in lieu" damages are mandatory when injury to copyright 
has been proved, but neither the actual damages to the copyright owner nor the in-
fringer's profit can be ascertained. Under the 1909 Act, if either actual damages or in-
fringer's profits are ascertainable, then the trial court has discretion to award statutory 
damages. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). Under the current Act, statutory damages are availa-
ble at plaintiff's election instead of, not in addition to, actual damages and profits. 17 
U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976). Such an award must be in excess of the amount which would have 
been awarded as profits or actual damages. Frank Music, 772 F.2d at 520. Under the 
current Act, statutory damages are limited to a maximum of $10,000 per work infringed, 
unless plaintiff shows the infringement was willful, in which case the maximum is 
$50,000 per work infringed. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976). 
46. 772 F.2d at 520. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. at 519. The district court's judgment was rendered "against defendants." 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted this to mean joint and several liability. [d. 
7
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share of infringing profits; one defendant is not liable for the 
profits of another.49 The panel remanded the question of joint 
liability to the district court, with instructions to consider de-
fendant producer-director's relation to the production (em-
ployee, independent contractor or partner), whether he received 
a salary or a percentage of profits from defendant MGM Grand, 
or whether he bore any risk of loss on the production.lio The 
panel went on to state that the hotel's parent company, MGM, 
Inc., might also be liable for its subsidiary, and the parent c~m­
pany's profits included in a damage calculation, if the district 
court should find a "substantial and continuing connection" be-
tween MGM Grand and MGM, Inc.lil 
The panel concluded by affirming the district court's dis-
missal of plaintiffs' unfair competition and breach of contract 
claims. iiI! 
III. CONCURRENCE 
Judge Reinhardt filed a one paragraph concurrence. While 
he agreed almost completely with the majority, he disagreed 
with the district court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to 
prove actual damage to their copyright. He concluded that the 
market value of the plaintiffs' copyright was reduced by the in-
clusion of Kismet music in over 1700 performances of defend-
ants' show. liS 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Ninth Circuit's decision is framed in terms of 
the 1909 Act, it is clear that its rulings regarding the inclusion of 
indirect profits are equally applicable to the provisions of the 
current Copyright Act.1i4 The current Act contains similar lan-
guage regarding recovery of an infringer's profits.1i1i This decision 
49.Id. 
50.Id. 
51. Id. at 519-20. The plaintiffs' would be limited to a single recovery, however, to 
be satisfied by either the parent or the subsidiary. Id. at 520. 
52. Id. at 520-21. 
53. 772 F.2d at 521 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
54. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976). 
55. The current statute provides, in pertinent part, for the recovery of "actual dam-
8
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could also significantly increase recovery for copyright infringe-
ment in the Ninth Circuit, as the new Act unequivocally pro-
vides that actual damages and infringer's profits are recover-
able. lle It will be interesting to note how other circuits deal with 
the indirect profits issue when confronted by it. The Ninth Cir-
cuit may well turn out to be a pioneer of larger awards for copy-
right infringement. 
David A. Fink* 
age suffered by ... [the copyright owner(s)) as a result of the infringement, and any 
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into 
account in computing the actual damages." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976) (emphasis added). 
The 1909 Act allowed recovery of "all the profits which the infringer shall have made 
from such infringement .... " 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970). See supra text accompanying 
notes 33-35. 
56. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976). For a discussion of this case as it impacts on copyright 
law practice, see 2 COPYRIGHT L.J. 38 (1985). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988. 
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